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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction – 2. The American way: some remarks – 2.1. The Google 
case: a test in real-time – 3. Yet another culture clash, or a simpler joint confusion? – 
4. Exploitation v. exclusion: planning the match – 5. Some conclusions (and a mod-
est proposal) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A comparative look at antitrust around the world – assuming the 
workability of a unitarian approach to a mosaic of more than 120 loc-
al disciplines, mostly tailored after the two prevailing models, US 
and EU, and yet capable of exhibiting, particularly at the enforce-
ment level, remarkable discrepancies – reveals a host of unsettled is-
sues. Margins for disagreement surface everywhere, though they do 
not precipitate serious conflict. But the discipline of unilateral con-
duct tells a different story.  
 Bluntly speaking, this antitrust province (a historical compon-
ent of all regulatory regions) denounces widespread inconsistencies 
related to its conceptual foundations. Confronting the two pivotal 
models of competition law, we cannot but observe that the American 
side does not recognize – at least apparently – exploitation as a form 
of abusive conduct  for the dominant firm, whereas its European 
standing is, at best, gloomy; on the other hand, the features of exclu-
sionary conduct are hotly contested. To say the least, the area is 
plagued by overwhelming confusion. 
 Actually, both monopolization (and attempt to monopolize) in 
the US and abuse of dominant position in Europe deal with the prob-
lematic evaluation of unilateral behaviors. Lack of clarity has been, 
and keeps being, a long running problem in monopolization/abuse of 
dominance discipline. Part of the problem lies with the failure to de-
velop a theory capable of rationalizing the case law, under the funda-
mental constraint that antitrust law should not impose sanctions for 
the very conduct it is supposed to encourage, i.e. a fierce (even mur-
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derous for undertakings) competition and the rush to appropriate 
the biggest gains from it. Drawing the line – that means distinguish-
ing between welfare-reducing conduct and aggressively pro-compet-
itive actions – is admittedly vexing. Just to cite the most blatant ex-
amples, low pricing, that benefits customers in the short run and 
stands as the very gist of a well-temperate competitive setting, may 
carry the risk of long-term exclusionary effects; whereas conduct ex-
hibiting restrictive short-term effects may support long-term innova-
tion or investment, that would improve consumer satisfaction. 
Monopolistic conduct is difficult to observe, define, and assess for a 
number of (obvious) reasons.   
 So far, the standard representation of a field fraught with 
severe analytical problems. But this kind of troubled overlapping is 
tainted by the remark that, much earlier in the course of the analysis 
– precisely at the level  of preliminary taxonomy – the two models 
appear to part company. The European approach distinguishes 
between ‘exclusionary’ abuses (which refer, more or less, to practices 
of a dominant firm seeking to harm the competitive position of its 
competitors and producing foreclosure effects on the market, with 
the problematic specifications that we will discuss in a while), and 
‘exploitative’ abuses, which can be defined as attempts by a domin-
ant undertaking to use the opportunities provided by its market 
strength in order to harm customers directly (excessive pricing being 
the standard assumption).1 No surprise, one would comment, since 
exploitation is the straightest form of deploying monopoly power. 
Yet, exploitation, in the vein of excessive pricing, is no issue in the US 
                                                 
1 Just in order to make things easier, a third category of abuses, the 'reprisal' ones, 
has also been supported, mainly referring to some conducts adopted by the 
dominant undertaking in order to discipline or to punish a competitor (cf. J. 
TEMPLE LANG, Monopolisation and the Definition of Abuse of a Dominant Position 
under Article 86 EEC Treaty, 16 Common Market Law Review, 345 (1979)). We men-
tioned it here for the sake of completeness, but we skip this broader taxonomy: 
as we will try to convince the reader, less is definitely more. 
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antitrust environment.2  
 In fact, the (in)famous Trinko decision states, inter alia, that 
“[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices, at least for a short 
period, is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces 
risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safe-
guard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power 
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct”.3 This makes crystal clear that, in the US, 
setting a more-than-competitive price not only escapes prohibition, 
but is the award reserved for the winners of the struggle in the mar-
ket arena. “Finis opus coronat”, as Justice Hand elegantly stated. “Al-
though the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the 
[Sherman] Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very 
forces which it is its prime object to foster”, so that “the successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins”.4  
 Furthermore, in the recent linkLine case5 the US Supreme 
Court stood still in its restrictive interpretation of price squeeze by 
expressly relying upon Trinko for the upstream markets price analys-
is, reaffirming at the same time the general principles of that decision 
about the scope of antitrust.6 Finally, the Google Books Saga goes on 
                                                 
2 The first formal announcement can be found in United States v. Standard Oil, 221 
U.S. 1, 62 (1911), stressing “omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly 
in the concrete”. But this may be considered, as of now, a locus classicus: cf., e.g.., 
E. T. SULLIVAN & J. L. HARRISON, Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic Implica-
tions, 5th ed., New York, 2009, 277. In fact, according to other commentators 
“even firms with considerable market power are generally permitted by  U.S. 
antitrust law to engage in simple monopoly pricing”, although “in jurisdictions 
other than the United States the principle is not always followed” (D. W. 
CARLTON & K. HEYER, Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust 
Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 Competition Policy International, 287 (2008)). 
3 Verizon Communication Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
4 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (1945). 
5 Pacific Bell Telephone v. linkLine Communications, 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009). 
6 The case sparked a lot of commentaries: for a more detailed and comparative 
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the stage: we will discuss the topic in a while, but let us first develop 
some remarks in order to (hopefully) better understand the main 
issues of the whole antitrust drama we are reviewing here. 
 
 
2. THE AMERICAN WAY: SOME REMARKS 
 
There is something paradoxical in the prevailing American attitude. 
After all, as perceptively noted by some commentators,7 exploitation 
of consumers is the textbook abuse by a monopolist or dominant 
firm. A part of the consumer surplus is redistributed to the monopol-
ist as producer surplus. This is the so-called price effect: consumers 
pay too much. Moreover, there is a dead-weight loss which lowers 
the welfare of the concerned economy. This is the so-called allocation 
effect: consumers purchase less (and here lies the mythical dead-
weight loss triangle).8  
 Monopoly is contrasted precisely for these kinds of effect. And 
we can also anticipate that foreclosure abuses are prohibited just be-
cause they are conducive to monopoly, which in turn will elicit ex-
ploitation. This being the original approach – “In the beginning there 
was Monopoly” – how can it be that, in the eyes of Justice Scalia (and 
Hand before him) the monopoly evils disappear from the scene and 
everything boils down to a gracious award for the winner of the 
competitive contest?  
 The reasons offered for such a diverging attitude can be sum-
                                                                                                                            
analysis, see, among others, G. FAELLA & R. PARDOLESI, Squeezing Price Squeeze 
under EC Antitrust Law, November 2009 (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478937). 
7 See, e.g., P. AKMAN,  Exploitative Abuse in Article 82 EC: Back to Basics?, January 
2009 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328316). 
8  For those interested in the source of the myth, a suggested reading is the article 
of H. WELLFORD, Introduction to Harberger’s Monopoly and Resource Allocation – 
The Pioneering Article on Deadweight Loss and Empirical Measurement of the Social 
costs of Monopoly, 5 Competition Policy International, 273 ff. (2009). 
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marized as follows. First, the law does not condemn dominance in 
and of itself, since it may very well be the outcome of the superior 
capabilities of the emerging monopolist: who is expected to behave 
as a rational profit maximizer, implying that he will be obviously 
inclining to exploit the advantageous position he conquered 
outpacing his rivals ("The mere possession of monopoly power, and 
the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not 
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system": 
again in the language of Trinko).9 This is why, according to the view 
we are examining, dominance law should downplay this scenario 
and seek to operate indirectly by addressing exclusionary or other 
illegal behavior that enables supra-competitive pricing.10  
The argument is, indeed, rather opaque (not to mention its 
                                                 
9 An intriguing reprise of the same principle has been proposed by Carlton & 
Heyer with their new distinction among single-firm 'extraction' and 'extension' 
conducts. Briefly, and apart from more detailed objections raised against some 
theoretical tenets of the said distinction (see E. ELHAUGE, Tying, Bundled Dis-
counts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harvard Law Review, 
397, 439 (2009)), according to these authors extraction is every “conduct en-
gaged in by the firm to capture surplus from what the firm has created in-
dependently of the conduct's effect on rivals”, where the surplus capture seems 
to be a bright reformulation of the good old (and allegedly legitimate) single 
monopoly profit, whereas extension “is single-firm conduct that increases the 
firm’s profit by weakening or eliminating the competitive constraints provided 
by rival’s products” (cf. D. W. CARLTON & K. HEYER (supra note 2), 285). As 
shown in our conclusions, beyond the appreciable idea that exclusion alone 
should not be relevant per se, the goal is not to introduce new taxonomies, but 
reduce the existing categories  focusing on exploitation as a precondition for 
assessing exclusion (see infra, Section 5). 
10 Proceeding in this vein, the argument  fades into the further claim about the 
standard redundancy of interventions aiming at contrasting a too high level of 
prices, since such an inconveniency is doomed to be corrected by the spontan-
eous reaction of the market forces, triggered by the appealing perspective of no-
ticeable profits. But that “excessive prices are self-correcting, because they at-
tract new entry” is a credo for true believers,  convincingly disproved by A. 
EZRACHI & D. GILO, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. Competition 
Law and Economics 249 (2009), suggesting that: (i) the entry decision does not 
depend on the pre-entry price, but on the expectations about the prevailing 
price level after entry; (ii) the signalling virtues of the pre-entry price are, at 
best, ambiguous. 
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discrepancy with both US and EU merger regulation, where the in-
tent of the law is precisely to impede the creation of monopoly 
power). Nevertheless, it might mean that the virtuous monopolist 
should be permitted to exploit as he pleases, whereas the malicious 
one should be constrained in his ambitions. In fact, the now disquali-
fied Report11 issued in 2008 by the US Department of Justice (herein-
after “US DoJ”) stresses the existence of a causal link between the 
conduct (improper means), contested in view of Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, and some form of monopoly power: “Firms with ill-gotten 
monopoly power can inflict on consumers higher prices, reduced 
output, and poor quality of services”.12 However, this way of reason-
ing does not avoid an internal contradiction: would firms, which be-
came monopolists because of their skills, not be able to inflict ana-
logue harms? There is no way out. If the proper goal of antitrust law 
is to preserve consumer welfare, one should conclude that con-
sumers get harmed in both cases, regardless of whether the domin-
ance was prompted by illegal tools or superior skill, luck and the 
like. 
But the plausible core of the argument lies elsewhere, and is 
connected with the second reason for absolving exploitation: its con-
tribution to incentivize fierce competition, leading to its end. Why 
should a firm bother to strive, invest, innovate and risk if, in the case 
it becomes the unchecked master of the market, it will be impeded 
                                                 
11 U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (October 2008). The announcement of the “with-
drawal” of the document, no longer reflecting the views of the DoJ Antitrust Di-
vision (since inspired to “extreme caution” dictated by fear of  “over-de-
terrence” and, accordingly, prone to create to many hurdles to government en-
forcement) was given in a speech of  Assistant Attorney General Christine Var-
ney on May 11, 2009. The new trend looks for “balanced analyses”, invoking the 
guidance – so to say! – of precedents like Loraine Journal (342 U.S. 143, 1951),  
Aspen (472 U.S. 585, 1985), and Microsoft (253 F.3d 34, D.C. Cir. 2001).   
12 US DoJ (supra note 11), 10. 
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from enjoying its win? Evans and Hylton,13 for instance, concede that 
“the proscribed and permitted activities are not consistent with the 
view that the antitrust laws are seeking to maximize static consumer 
or social welfare in a relevant antitrust market (…) greater market 
power results in consumers paying higher prices, obtaining less 
output, and receiving less consumer surplus than they would with 
lesser market power”. They also admit that “greater market power 
also results in lower social surplus since the exercise of market power 
results in units of output not being produced for which the value of 
the output to consumers is greater than the cost to society of 
producing that output”. But they do not object to antitrust laws that 
“provide businesses with wide latitude for acquiring and exercising 
significant market power” (put in other words: if dominance is 
permitted, as it is, the dominator should be free to behave rationally, 
that is, maximizing his profits). 
How reconcile this apparent contrast? It is suggested that  
monopoly can, and should, be seen as part of a dynamic process of 
competition, though Schumpeter’s “perennial gale of creative de-
struction” is, to say the least, uncommon in the American setting and 
quite at odds with the approach, mainly geared to short-termism, un-
derlying the prevailing view of the consumer harm test.14 At any rate, 
I contend that the emphasis on innovation (and on virtual conflict 
among IPRs and antitrust enforcement) is a metonymic exercise of 
specialization, which obfuscates the picture. Couched in more gener-
al terms, my claim is that a firm which was until yesterday the best 
                                                 
13 D. S. EVANS & K. N. HYLTON, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly 
Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, May 2009 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275431). 
14 Further, even more compelling, hesitations stem from the impracticability, de-
nounced already by Demsetz and as of now still unsolved, of trade-offs between 
non-homogeneous value dimensions: cf., recently, J. D. WRIGHT, Antitrust, Multi-
Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory 
of Competition Now?, August 2009 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463732). 
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contender and behaved exemplarily, nowadays finds itself on the top 
and alone (a contingency which was not necessarily within the ex-
pectations, since an as-efficient rival would have still been there) and 
reneges the virtues practiced so far. The discontinuity is obvious, so 
that trading ex-ante incentives with ex-post exploitation, never 
handed down as a deserved trophy for a contest that did not require 
a winner, would produce, at best, unintended consequences.  
 
 
2.1 THE GOOGLE CASE: A TEST IN REAL-TIME  
 
An analysis of the risky trading mentioned above is being carried out 
by the US DoJ, which opened an investigation into the competitive 
impact of the Google Books Search Settlement (hereinafter “GBS”) 
that Google Inc., the Authors Guild Inc., and the Association of 
American Publishers are trying to get approved by the New York 
Southern District Court in order to settle a class action filed in 2005.  
 As the story is well known, we will just recall its very basics. 
Some years ago Google started to digitize a huge number of books, 
both in- and out-of-copyright, in order to make them available on-
line: it did so by scanning and indexing the texts by means of a new 
technical process developed for this specific purpose. The main 
sources for these digitizing activities were provided by the Google 
Partner Program and the Google Library Program, entered into with 
some publishers and academic libraries. However, Google also relied 
upon mass copying without having previously obtained any license 
from the rightsholders: the delicate issue of the so called “orphan 
books” (that is, copyrighted works whose rightsholders cannot be 
located) lies precisely at the heart of this activity.  
 The Authors Guild, together with other plaintiffs who were 
not partners of any of the programs boldly launched by Google, filed 
a class action against the firm for copyright infringement. After this 
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filing, all parties started to discuss a possible settlement that morph-
ed into a joint venture agreement for the merchandising of digitized 
books worldwide.15 On the basis of its latest version,16 the GBS “gives 
Google default rights to digitalize and make searchable all books 
published before January 5, 2009” – the date of the first notice of the 
class action settlement – “and to display and sell digital versions of 
all commercially unavailable books, unless the book rightsholder 
chooses otherwise”.17 As a matter of fact, the GBS aims at establishing 
a global marketplace for books rights, whose exploitation will be 
provided by Google and controlled by a new legal entity committed 
to checking and clarifying the copyright status of the items, the 
Books Rights Registry, with future revenues to be shared among 
Google, the Books Rights Registry, the publishers, and the authors.  
 The Google case provides us with a brilliant example of 
single-firm conduct that fills all the criteria for tracing brave risk-tak-
ing, innovation, economic growth (remember what Trinko stated), but 
could at the same time threaten the market's development.18 In fact, 
the competitive impact of the GBS has been denounced by the media 
since the beginning of the agreement's negotiation, as well as by 
                                                 
15 As already noted by a keen commentator, “[a]bsent the lawsuit by the Authors 
Guild, Google and interested rightsholders could have crafted a deal very much 
like that in the settlement agreement and would have implemented that 
through private contracts. That deal, of course, would be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny, as it would involve large numbers of otherwise competing rightshold-
ers contracting together with Google. That would not be unprecedented - we 
have similarly complex arrangements for other copyright collectives like 
ASCAP and BMI - but definitely worth antitrust attention” (cf. R. PICKER, The 
Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly?, July 2009, 3 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1387582). 
16 See www.googlebooksettlement.com. 
17 Cf. E. ELHAUGE, Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive, December 
2009, 1 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1459028). 
18 A sound market definition for the GBS antitrust assessment is a very delicate is-
sue that we will not address here. For a valuable analysis see E. FRASER, 
Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of Simultaneity, June 2009, 
10 ff. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1417722).  
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many commentators operating at the (escalating) scholar forefront of 
the legal battlefield. Moreover, a Statement of Interest recently sub-
mitted to the District Court by the US DoJ has stressed the main com-
petition concerns of the case, providing some important hints about 
how the new US Antitrust administration is interpreting its enforce-
ment capabilities.  
 According to this document, many features of the GBS “bear 
an uncomfortably close resemblance to the kinds of horizontal agree-
ments found to be quintessential per se violations of the Sherman 
Act”.19 To sum up, the GBS is plagued by one cartel pricing issue 
(mainly related to the activities to be carried out by Google as the 
rightsholder's exclusive agent in setting the price of on-line access to 
consumers, by means of a secret pricing algorithm), that mixes with a 
monopolization issue. Moreover, the opt-out structure of the settle-
ment will give Google a default right to digitize orphan books and to 
include them in its services: by doing, so the GBS will award Google 
a non-replicable advantage (and consequent market power with cor-
related market foreclosure) in respect to all other competitors, who 
will remain exposed to the risk of copyright infringements while at-
tempting to digitize orphan books. Put in very clear words, “compet-
ing authors and publishers grant Google de facto exclusive rights for 
                                                 
19 More specifically, the proposed agreement will drive to: “(1) the creation of an 
industry-wide revenue-sharing formula at the wholesale level applicable to all 
works; (2) the setting of default prices and the effective prohibition of discount-
ing by Google at the retail level; and (3) the control of prices for orphan books” 
- those with unknown rightsholders - “by known publishers and authors with 
whose books the orphan books likely compete”. As a consequence, “In the view 
of the Department, the proposed Settlement raises two serious issues. First, 
through collective action, the Proposed Settlement appears to give book pub-
lishers the power to restrict price competition. Second, as a result of the Pro-
posed Settlement, other digital distributors may be effectively precluded from 
competing with Google in the sale of digital products and other derivative 
products to come”. See US DoJ, Statement of Interest of the United States of Amer-
ica regarding the Proposed Class Settlement, filed September 19, 2009, 17-16 
(http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/usa.pdf).  
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the digital distribution of orphan works”,20 i.e. products issued by 
their own competitors. Quoting a statement from Toy “R” US. Inc., v. 
FTC,21 the US DoJ considered that “such joint effort by a firm or firms 
to disadvantage competitors by either directly denying or 
persuading or coercing suppliers or consumers to deny relationships 
the competitors need in the competitive struggle” will have 
“significant anticompetitive potential and may violate the antitrust 
laws”.22 
 By the same token, the end results of the GBS foster the rather 
interesting conclusion that being sued (and then being able to settle 
in the way Google and the plaintiffs are trying to do) may somehow 
be very useful. Prior to the proposed settlement, Google could only 
rely upon the fair use doctrine for providing the digital consumers 
with very limited text excerpts without having previously obtained 
for the permission from the rightsholders. This activity would argu-
ably require impressive legal and organizational efforts for searching 
for the rightsholders and then negotiating with them. After the settle-
ment, however, Google will have full rights to offer the complete 
texts of virtually any books published (mainly) in USA before Janu-
ary 2009, together with the related services developed on the basis of 
their digitized corpus.23  
 Finally, according to the GBS, Google will manage the sub-
scriptions (required both of private users and of institutions, e.g. aca-
demic libraries) for having access to the entire body of digitized 
works. In fact, “The settlement also procompetitively creates a brand 
new product, the institutional subscription, which gives institutions 
                                                 
20 US DoJ (supra note 19), 23. 
21 221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2000). 
22 US DoJ (supra note 19), 23. 
23 In the words of another commentator (E. FRASER (supra note 18), 22), “Obtaining 
permission from orphan works’ authors is literally impossible and even obtain-
ing permission from active rightsholders involves tremendous transaction costs. 
Under the settlement agreement, Google will be able to display full books and 
charge for the books or the service.” 
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the ability to fully view all out-of-print books that are available for 
purchase through Google and all in-print books that the rightshold-
ers elect to include in the subscription […] Creating this new product 
is a huge procompetitive benefit that could not exist absent the settle-
ment. Non-digital technology simply does not permit a book suppli-
er to sell blanket access to millions of volumes”.24  
 Critics, however, object that Google will have a monopoly 
over such institutional subscriptions, and will be able to charge a mo-
nopoly price. All in all, and contrary to the premises canvassed in the 
previous section, most observers look suspiciously at the pricing pol-
icy Google will adopt, since the firm could arguably be tempted to 
charge the consumers high (even exorbitant) service fees in the fu-
ture, thanks to the digital knowledge monopoly guaranteed by the 
agreement with the rightsholders provided by the GBS (and in line 
with what already happened with electronic subscription to schol-
arly journals).25 Whether such a suspicion is well founded, whether  
the competitive-pricing algorithm is exposed to misuse and will 
work as a smart regulatory tool, whether having a monopolist offer a 
product is better for consumer welfare than having no one offer a 
                                                 
24 Cf. Amicus Brief of Antitrust Law and Economics Professors in Support of the Settle-
ment, filed September 8, 2009, 21 (http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2005cv08136/273913/275/0.pdf). See also E. ELHAUGE 
(supra note 17), 47 ff. 
25 “The most serious and widely shared concern expressed by academic author 
and library commentators on the GBS settlement is the risk that GBS institution-
al license fees will rise to exorbitant levels because the proposed settlement 
lacks meaningful constraints on price hikes” (see P. SAMUELSON, The Google Book 
Settlement: Real Magic or a Trick?, The Economist's Voice, November 2009; 
www.bepress.com/ev). In fact, according to another commentator, Google 
“could also employ a strategy comparable to the one that proved to be so effect-
ive in pushing up the price of scholarly journals: first, entice subscribers with 
low initial rates, and then, once they are hooked, ratchet up the rates as high as 
the traffic will bear.” (R. DARNTON, Google & the Future of Books. New York Review 
of Books, February 12, 2009; quotation from C. SUAREZ, Proactive FTC/DOJ Inter-
vention in the Google Book Search Settlement: Defending Our Public Values, Protect-
ing Competition, November 2009 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409824), who also 
shows strong concerns related to Google’s future pricing strategy: cf. 22 ff.).   
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product: all these questions, and the countless others that can be 
raised, are well beyond the reach of this paper. What really matters, 
from our standpoint, is that the US Government (and most people 
with it) has expressed strong concern with regard to consumer harm 
theoretically stemming from Google's future possible monopoliza-
tion activities. When it comes to prospective, but tangible, monopoly, 
the award-for-the-winner enthusiasm withers, and the specter of ex-
ploitation surfaces. 
Far from what is the design adopted by the parties for the  set-
tlement, “the end result [of the GBS] should be a marketplace in 
which consumers can be assured that they are paying competitive 
prices for the benefit they receive – in a marketplace in which they 
have multiple outlets from which to obtain access to works. The be-
nefits of this settlement should not be achieved through unjustified 
restrictions on competition”.26 Read this line carefully: does it not 
sound like an alarm-bell against future exploitative abuses by the 
winning monopolist? Or as a threat of a technological adaptation of 
Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451? Finis opus coronat, for sure, but with a new, 
very puzzling caveat.  
 
 
3. YET ANOTHER CULTURE CLASH, OR A SIMPLER JOINT CON-
FUSION?  
 
Apart from what the Google search for a settlement solution will 
fetch the US antitrust enforcement, and coming back to what accoun-
ted in chapter 2, additional arguments are being deployed for mis-
trusting the exploitation perspective. However, they do not longer 
belong to the American side of the story, which precludes the conclu-
sion that the inconveniency regards exclusively the overseas experi-
ence. 
                                                 
26 US DoJ (supra note 19), 4. 
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It is true, in fact, that Article 82 (a) of the EC Treaty forbids the 
imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; but it is no less evident that the case law has greatly em-
phasized exclusionary effects, with exploitative effects appearing to 
be little more than a sideshow. Given the original sin of Article 82 – 
its lack of clear definitions about the concepts of 'abuse' and 
'dominant position' –, such definitions had to be “defined by the ECJ 
in leading cases thirty years ago. These definitions do not employ 
'economic' terminology and sit uneasily with modern economic 
theory. However, they appear to be set in stone”.27 It is no wonder, 
therefore, that the European enforcement policy could develop a 
kind of 'cherry-picking approach' by focusing on the so-called 
exclusionary abuses. Again, it comes to the surprise of no one that: 
(i), when the ongoing review of Article 82 was launched, 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes could confidently comment that the 
enforcement policy should give priority to the exclusionary abuses, 
“since exclusion is often at the basis of later exploitation of 
consumers”;28 and (ii) the ensuing Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 (hereinafter “Guidance 
Paper”) devoted the issue one short paragraph, stating that Article 
82(a) is, to be sure, still in force and would be applied when 
necessary. But, on its face, it does not belong to the priorities of the 
Commission.29 
                                                 
27 A. JONES & B. SUFRIN, EC Competition Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, 3th ed., Ox-
ford, 2008, 296. 
28 N. KROES, Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, speech delivered at 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute on September 23, 2005, 3 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537&for
mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). 
29 “For the purpose of providing guidance on its enforcement priorities the Com-
mission at this stage limits itself to exclusionary conduct and in, particular, cer-
tain specific types of exclusionary conduct which, based on its experience, ap-
pear to be the most common”. Cf. Guidance on the Commission's enforcement pri-
orities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dom-
inant undertakings, 2009/C 45/02, 2, § 7 (available at http://eur-
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In fact, though not banned as in the US, exploitation does not 
fare very well in Europe either. Beyond the first impression, and tak-
ing account of the fact that excessive pricing exploitation has been re-
cognized only in the presence of special circumstances (de facto 
monopoly, impediments to the internal market, and threat to liberal-
ization programs: only four cases concluded with condemnation),30 it 
has been submitted that  the US and EU perspectives on the issue do 
not necessarily appear far apart.31 There is widespread consensus on 
the idea that competition law should not intervene where the market 
can be expected to self-correct exploitation of contingent, short-term 
disequilibria; and the European side accepts, no less than the transat-
lantic counterpart, that an economic rationale for price regulation ex-
ists only where non-transitory barriers (such as a government mono-
poly) exclude competition in the long term. At the end of the day, it is 
hinted that the difference might boil down to different allocation of 
competences (implying, however, that the EU Commission is reluct-
antly vested with some regulatory power). 
The prevailing distaste (“benign neglect”,32 that translates into 
“the lesser, the better”) for an approach which rings of regulation is 
supported by most scholars active in the field. However, beyond the 
ideological bias against a creeping, yet unacceptable, form of regula-
tion, the concrete reasons for leaving the exploitative abuse in an al-
most forgotten corner can be grouped, according to a keen comment-
                                                                                                                            
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm).  
30 See Commission decisions on case IV/28.851 General Motors, December 19, 1974; 
case IV/26.699 Chiquita (United Brands), December 17, 1975; case 84/379/EEC 
British Leyland, July 2, 1984; case COMP/C-1/36.915 Deutsche Post AG, July 25, 
2001 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). 
31 Cf., also for further references, H. SCHWEITZER, Parallels and Differences in the 
Attitude towards Single-Firm Conduct: What Are the Reasons? The History, 
Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC, 
February 2008 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093248). 
32 R. O’DONOGHUE & J. A. PADILLA, The Law and Economics of Article 82 CE, Oxford, 
2006, 608. 
  17 
ator,33 around four clusters: I) measurement issues, II) market dy-
namics, III) multi-sided markets, and IV) remedies. Taken together, 
these problems should explain why we would be better advised to 
quit any attempt to re-animate an almost agonizing statutory ban.  
 Little to say on cluster I). Assessing the fairness of prices is in-
herently more difficult than measuring costs, which is, if not a neces-
sary step in the process, the usual benchmark. Prices, induced by the 
equilibrium between demand and supply, are not genuinely unfair 
even when they do not conform to some appropriate level of mark-
up on underlying costs. But daunting as it may be, this difficulty 
should not be exaggerated.34 In fact, reckoning the overcharge im-
posed by a cartel is a routine task for devising damages in actions 
promoted by the victims of illegal conduct, and not even the most re-
silient opponent of private enforcement in antitrust would argue that 
damages are to be denied just because it is difficult to quantify them. 
The second point is largely overlapping with the Austrian 
variation already touched upon with regard to the US debate and the 
choice not to tackle exploitation. There must be incentives for innova-
tion, and opportunities for investments. But the intangibility of huge 
monopoly profits grossly oversteps the mark. 
As to multi-side markets, it is probably sound to convene, 
with George Priest,35 that the existence of network effects requires a 
change in many of the basic operative presumptions of antitrust law, 
leading to a new conceptualization of key enforcement problems. 
Whenever these characteristics surface, we should be prepared to 
challenge our tenets. But, though important, network effects are not 
                                                 
33 B. LYONS, The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse, January 2008, 6 ff. 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1082723). 
34 A kind of roadmap for the excessive pricing assessment has been recently 
sketched by the Commission: see its decision in case COMP/36.568 Scandlines 
Sverige v. Port of Helsingborg, July 23, 2004 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). 
35 G. L. PRIEST, Rethinking Antitrust Law in an Age of Network Industries, November 
2007 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031166). 
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ever present and do not dominate the field. 
Thus, the crux of the matter should be with cluster IV). For un-
fair prices seem to postulate a remedy which is largely regulatory in 
nature and is supposed to go beyond the expertise and capabilities of 
an antitrust authority (“a generalist competition agency – it has been 
argued – is unlikely to have the skills and resources to do an effective 
job, it would do more harm than good by setting inappropriate 
prices, either too low or too high, and encourage regulated firms to 
waste resources trying to manipulate a weak regulator”).36 A 
compromise, which is being advanced in the recent literature,37 is 
that exploitation is provoked by exclusion, mainly sub specie of entry 
barriers, either structural or accrued over time for want of a timely 
check to exclusionary practices: get rid of them, of the accumulation 
of their effects, and exploitation will fade away. True as it may be, 
this view implies that, whenever it is not possible to tackle exclusion 
directly, exploitation will stand (and should be reproached). 
Moreover, even if one wonders about which remedy would turn out 
to be more effective, this does not undermine the case for inflicting a 
dissuasive sanction, possibly coupled with proper damages. Some 
deterrence would probably be attained anyway.  
Criticisms do abound. Yet, none seems cogent. The ban of ex-
ploitation lacks justification. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Cf. B. LYONS (supra note 33). For a general survey of some excessive pricing 
cases and the claim that even among competition agencies there is a growing 
consensus that controlling prices should be limited to exceptional 
circumstances, see D. GERADIN, The Necessary Limits to the Control of 'Excessive' 
Prices by Competition Authorities - A View from Europe, November 2007 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1022678).  
37 “Gap cases”, and the necessity of closing previous loopholes, are emphasized 
by L. H. RÖLLER, Exploitative Abuses, in C. D. EHLERMAN & M. MARQUIS (eds.), 
European Competition Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 CE, Oxford, 
2008, who pursues the coherence of an enforcement based on the exclusive re-
pression of exclusionary practices. 
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4. EXPLOITATION V. EXCLUSION: PLANNING THE MATCH 
 
Summing up, on this count. Exploitation has never established itself 
in the American scenario (although the incoming solution of the 
Google case and its possible antitrust aftermath will arguably 
provide us very soon with some interesting new topics to be dis-
cussed, starting from the apparently intertwined relationships 
between Section 1 and 2 Sherman Act issues), and plays almost no 
role in Europe – just a potential threat, which is evoked from time to 
time as an almost remote Armageddon.  
 This practical emasculation of the relevant discipline (thus di-
vested of what O’Donogue and Padilla deem to be its very core)38 
makes, in our opinion, little sense either in economic or legal terms, 
and leaves the overall conceptual picture in a state of complete disar-
ray (though mostly ignored, when not discarded with the intimation 
that “a revival of exploitation abuses in European competition law 
(…) is both unlikely and undesirable”).39 Its implications contribute, 
as will be seen in a while, to further dismembering any attempt to 
come to grips with some sort of coherent enforcement. As a con-
sequence of the above reluctance (or deliberate renunciation) to pro-
hibit directly exploitative abuses, attention is totally absorbed by ex-
clusionary behavior. But the frailty of the ensuing picture is waiting 
in the wings and will not be late in blurring the analysis. 
 Concerning the definition of exclusionary practices, let us be 
‘fast and furious’. No business conduct can be proscribed simply be-
cause it aims to deter entry or force exit of rivals. Every firm would 
be willing to trash its competitors; if achieved on the merits, such an 
outcome is not objectionable.40 Accordingly, ‘exclusionary practices’ 
                                                 
38 O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA (supra note 32), 637. 
39 H. SCHWEITZER (supra note 31). 
40 The EU position towards this kind of competition struggle has been vividly 
stated by  commissioner Kroes, “I like aggressive competition – including by 
dominant companies – and I don't care if it may hurt competitors – as long as it 
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is a shorthand formula evoking conduct which hampers rivals in an 
anticompetitive way. From this standpoint, the legal concepts of 
monopolization in the US – which assumes the existence of a causal 
link between the contested conduct (improper means) and some 
form of monopoly power – and abuse of dominance in the EU may 
largely converge.  
To be more precise, Section 2 of the Sherman Act has been his-
torically construed as requiring monopoly power, willfully achieved 
or preserved by means of behaviors which do not pertain to competi-
tion on the merits, and thus forbidding all strategies that entail 
monopolization, and attempts to monopolize the market, including 
specific means that make it impossible for rivals to engage in fair 
competition (e.g., deceptive practices).41 But modern elaboration has 
consistently held that monopolistic conduct corresponds to acts that: 
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging mono-
poly power by illegally impairing the opportunities of rivals; and 
either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for 
the particular consumer benefits claimed for them.42 At first glance, 
this approach is wholly echoed by the ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’ 
language of the EU Commission's Guidance Paper (as, from the 
American side, by the US DoJ Statement of Interest in the Google 
case). The last statement, however, might prove wishful thinking. At 
a closer inspection, the avowed commitment to protect consumers’ 
interests reveals an astonishing loophole. The Commission’s framing 
of anticompetitive foreclosure hinges on a three-pronged finding: (i) 
foreclosure, (ii) anti-competitiveness, and (iii) harm to consumers. 
                                                                                                                            
ultimately benefits competitors” (N. KROES, supra note 28). 
41 See, for instance, M.S. STUCKE, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat 
a Dominant Firm’s Deception, May 2009 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395076). 
42 The “standard reference”, by P. E. AREEDA & D.F. TURNER, Antitrust Law, vol. III, 
Boston, 1978, 78, is echoed by Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585, 605 and note 32 (1985). 
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Whilst the first and the third factors are aptly identified, item (ii) is 
left almost undefined or, according to another interpretation, com-
pletely absorbed by the prerequisite of harm to consumers.  
Both options are unfortunate. Regarding the former, shutting 
eyes on the traditionally perplexing question about what is bad and 
what is not, succeeds, at most, in delaying the difficulties, at the price 
of rendering them more inextricable. That the conduct of the domin-
ant firm creates opportunities “to profitably increase price to the det-
riment of consumers” does not help make it clear whether, for in-
stance, aggressive initiatives driving rivals out of business should be 
deemed anticompetitive, simply because of the “special responsibil-
ity” (not to mention the one charged to the controversial club of the 
super-dominant undertakings) preventing it from undertaking con-
duct allowed to its competitors.43 Even the introduction of successful 
(and not readily replicable) innovation by the dominant firm might 
be suspicious (which is not the case). Lest this kind of reverse dis-
crimination, once passively received but nowadays hotly contested, 
conquer new luster, one should specify that the conduct triggering 
the alteration of the market must be contrary to some set of the re-
ceived rules of the game.  
But beware! If, in order to by-pass the problem of indefinite-
ness, we re-focus (as we were accustomed to doing in the past) on the 
stigma of anticompetitiveness, a new/old risk materializes: that of 
endorsing a disguised form of unfair competition devoted exclus-
ively to Big Brothers, but inspired to the common goal of protecting 
competitors instead of competition. Condemnation might ensue even 
though, for want of causation, the monopolist’s conduct – say, deceit, 
in the form of product disparagement, concededly immoral – does 
not impair competition.  
This risk (and thus we come to the latter interpretation we 
                                                 
43 For some sharp critics about this issue, see J. P. AZEVEDO & M. WALKER, Domin-
ance: Meaning and measurement, European Competition Law Review, 363 ff. (2002). 
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were alluding to) is exorcized by the requirement of harm to con-
sumers, charged with the task of separating the wheat from the chaff 
(foreclosure, by whatever means, is illegal only when it hurts con-
sumers). Or so it should be, since § 21 of the Guidance Paper hints at 
special cases – conduct which can only impair competition, without 
creating any efficiency: i.e., when the dominant undertaking prevents 
its customers from testing rivals’ products, or finances the former in 
order to delay the commercialization of such products (look at the 
Intel case).44 In such situations, the Commission warns, consumer 
harm can simply be inferred: a proposal which comes close to stating 
that prejudice for consumers will be presumed, whether it exists or 
not (which drives us back to an unfair-competition-like stance).  
In this vein, in fact, a still more general risk appears to lie in 
ambush: that harm to consumers could be given, despite the verbal 
prominence, only lip-service, consisting in taking it for granted, 
whenever the competitive process is somehow distorted (vaporware 
might be a typical example, since the bogus announcements will 
hamper competitors’ inroad into the market, without necessarily im-
plying material prejudice for consumers). Actually, Article 82 EC is 
primarily applied with the aim of preserving open market structures; 
and preserving an open market structure may, or may not, maximize 
consumer welfare. Likelihood of harm becomes the magic formula. 
And if likelihood is easily conceded whenever some kind of remote 
threat to the competitive process can be conceived of in the long run, 
as it seems to be the case in Europe, the ever-present temptation to 
turn the dominance law in a tool protecting self-serving operators 
comes again to the forefront. Note, moreover, that such an approach, 
pushed to its extreme coherence, would lead to the unintended but 
logical consequence that every kind of competitive efforts, in so far as 
they curb rivals and prompt monopolistic success (with cogent likeli-
                                                 
44 See Commission’s decision in case COMP/C-3/37990 Intel, May 13, 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel.html). 
  23 
hood of price increase), should be condemned – unless, it goes 
without saying, one adheres to the Trinko rationale. 
All in all, among manifold difficulties that postulate further 
refinements, anticompetitive foreclosure as an antitrust abuse is de-
fensible only if unequivocally based on proof of material damages to 
consumers; it must provoke, or unequivocally threaten, exploitation. 
The three factors mentioned by the Commission collapse into a single 
plot: firms with monopoly or near-monopoly power are likely to 
injure consumers by improperly preventing rivals (or would-be 
rivals) from constraining the exercise of that power. 
 
 
5. SOME CONCLUSIONS (AND A MODEST PROPOSAL) 
 
Thus, we come to a rather perplexing conclusion. In order to gain a 
distinctive antitrust role, different from the coverage of contract and 
unfair competition laws,45 the exclusionary abuse requires exploita-
tion. But exploitation, in itself, is either dropped or ignored by the 
antitrust enforcement. The logical short circuit could not be any 
worse.46 This is why we believe that, despite its believed sophistica-
                                                 
45 European tradition is, under this point of view, rather peculiar, since it exhibits 
a whole set of apparent examples of aporia. For some short remarks about the 
subtle relationships among antitrust and unfair competition provisions, see R. 
PARDOLESI, La disciplina della concorrenza: uno sguardo d'insieme, in R. PARDOLESI 
& R. ROMANO, La concorrenza e la tutela dell’innovazione, Giuffré, Milan, 2009, 3 ff.  
46 The paradox becomes, at times, involuntarily grotesque. In re-shaping specu-
larly the usual approach to the less intuitive monopsony frame (and thus reaf-
firming that “unilateral efforts by a monopsony to force prices downward tradi-
tionally do not violate the antitrust laws”, whereas, “when collusion is involved 
[…] Section 1 of the Sherman Act has been brought to bear”), two commentat-
ors do not hesitate to intimate that “there is nothing to recommend collusive 
monopsony. The efforts of collusive monopsonists to obtain lower prices do  not 
translate into lower prices for consumers, but only into higher profits for them-
selves”. Just a moment earlier, the single monopsonist had eschewed any re-
proach (See R.D. BLAIR & J.L. HARRISON, The Antitrust Response to Monopsony and 
Collusive Monopsony, August 2009, 18-24 
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tion, the discipline of unilateral conduct is in desperate need of being 
rebuilt from scratch.  
As a first step out of this conundrum, and as a modest propos-
al for revamping the exhausted notion of antitrust injury, it might be 
argued that pure exploitation should be found abusive, whenever it 
constitutes more than a contract law problem. On the contrary, pure 
exclusion, without exploitation, should not be found abusive, in or-
der to avoid protecting competitors rather than competition (with re-
gard to Google and the scenarios depending on the approval of the 
GBS, we are obviously moving in the hyperuranium of the antitrust 
hypotheses, but the least we can say is that this issue should be very 
carefully considered by the US DoJ while trying to assess the future 
possible moves of Google as the new digital knowledge 
monopolist).47 As forcefully argued by Advocate General Mazák in 
his conclusions about the Wanadoo case appeal, if the predator’s pos-
sibility of recouping losses through supra-competitive pricing is 
ruled out, there should be, in principle, no antitrust intervention, 
since consumers suffer no harm.48 
Accordingly, exploitation should be used as the test of anti-
competitive effects on the market: this would ultimately imply, Oc-
cam’s razor in hand, that there is only one type of abuse. Keep it 
simple. 
                                                                                                                            
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1459163)). 
47 Incidentally, and apart from the implications of the case to be better addressed 
under a public (better, constitutional) law point of view, we opine that the GBS 
may present two different antitrust issues. The first is a typical cartel one, pos-
sibly relevant under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, related to the agreements 
among Google and the coalition of the willing (settlers). Then, even if Google 
could also be imagined as a kind of monopolist on commission (with the right-
sholder's guilds as instigators: see R. PICKER (supra note 15), 15), the second 
issue should be regarded as a pure Section 2 case, with sole (eventual) relevance 
of the monopolist's conduct, were he to exploit the consumers by means of a 
strangling pricing policy related to the so-called institutional subscriptions.   
48 Cf. Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v. Commission of the European Communities, 
September 25, 2008, Opinion of Advocate General (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). 
